A Business Cycle Model with Sticky Pricing and Endogenous Capital by Ming Lin
A Business Cycle Model with Sticky Pricing and
Endogenous Capital
Ming Lin1
Tepper School of Business,
Carnegie Mellon University,
E-mail: mingl@andrew.cmu.edu
Version: version 3, Nov, 2004
In this paper, we will study some business cycle models with sticky pricing and endogenous
and ￿rm-speci￿c capital. We also manage to incorporate capital utilization into the models.
As revealed by the simulation results, the cyclical behaviors of our business cycle models
are quite normal compared with the literature and those of the actual economy except the
simulated correlations between in￿ ation and output. Such simulation result is mainly because
in symmetric equilibriums, money in our models turns out to be superneutral.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we will study some business cycle models with sticky pricing and
endogenous capital.
As commented by King & Rebelo (1999), after decades of accumulated e⁄orts since
the 1930s, Kydland & Prescott (1982) and Long & Plosser (1983) ￿rst strikingly showed
the promise of establishing the Real Business Cycle (RBC) models consistent with the
actual economy on its key real variables￿properties, including their persistences, volatil-
ities and comovements with the other key real variables. Summary literature may also
refer to Cooley & Prescott (1995). Following the RBC theoretic developments, the New
Keynesian Economics (NKE) emerge, attempting to interpret the nominal aspect of the
economy and provide as well an justi￿cation for monetary policy. Compared with the
standard RBC framework, the NKE stresses one de￿ning departure, i.e., price is sticky,
rather than ￿ exible as assumed by the RBC theory. As reviewed in Ball, Mankiw &
Romer (1988), the nominal rigidities in Keynesian models in the 1970s were assumed
rather than explained. Now after years of e⁄orts, price stickiness, initially simply an
assumption in view of its empirical relevance, is made to be part of agents￿optimization
outcomes by assuming that individual ￿rms have market powers, i.e., they are price
setters, but not price takers as assumed by the RBC theory. In the aggregate level, it
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1is assumed according to the widely used Calvo pricing environment (Calvo, 1983), that
at each period only a fraction, but not all of the ￿rms will adjust their product prices
due to the related adjustment costs. Some of the other early famous NKE literatures
may refer to Fischer (1977), Taylor(1979,1980), Rotemberg (1982), Mankiw (1985). The
subsequently important papers on sticky pricing may include McCallum (1994,1999a)
and Mankiw & Reis (2001). All of the above mentioned pricing models are categorized
as time dependent models due to the recently developed state dependent sticky pricing
models, in which the number of ￿rms adjusting prices is modeled to be endogenous, but
not as exogenous as it is in the time dependent models. Papers may refer to Dotsey,
King & Wolman (1999), Burstein (2002).
As is well known, capital dynamics is essentially important for the RBC models.
But in the NKE literature, capital is generally assumed to be constant, which seems
not very acceptable from the RBC theory perspective. So, in this paper we will study
the business cycle models with sticky pricing and endogenous capital. In the modeling
process we will try to make our model be as similar as possible to the standard RBC
model. Also, as argued by Woodford (2003, Chp 5), we will set the capital here to be
￿rm-speci￿c.
There is another consideration why we think we may need to endogenize capital. A
recent development in the RBC theory is, capital utilization matters for business cycles,
although the capital itself may not. The literature may refer to Burnside & Eichenbaum
(1996), Baxter & Farr (2001), King & Rebelo (1999), etc. So, we have to ￿rst endogenize
capital if planning to investigate the role of capital utilization in business cycles.
Considering the input structure of a Cobb-Douglas production function with both
capital and labor as input factors, we may also need to emphasize the role of labor
utilization, i.e., the employment rate. So, in the next section 2, we will ￿rst start
from the paper of Hansen (1985) to discuss how to introduce labor utilization and
further capital utilization respectively into business cycle models, and treat them as the
benchmark models for the two models to be de￿ned in section 3 and 4 respectively for
further comparisons in section 5.
The rest of the paper are organized as follows. In section 3, we construct a business
cycle model with sticky pricing and endogenous and ￿rm-speci￿c capital. In section 4,
we incorporate capital utilization into the model de￿ned in section 3. In section 5, we
discuss the related simulation results of the four models given in section 2, 3, and 4.
Section 6 is the concluding remark.
2. THE BENCHMARK RBC MODELS : MODELS (1) AND (2)
2.1. Model (1)
We ￿rst make a review of the business cycle models due to Hansen (1985) for the
sake of future simulation result comparisons.
Primarily due to Hansen (1985), in which a lottery probability is introduced into the
households￿labor decision, the RBC theory can also deal with labor market ￿ uctuations
nicely. Let￿ s repeat Hansen￿ s lottery theory of labor supply brie￿ y as follows.
Each individual in the economy has to choose between working a ￿xed shift of ht
hours and not working at all. So, the choice for the household is, either work ht hours,
or, 0 hours regardless of how many hours such an individual ideally wants to choose
2￿ exibly, i.e., choose to work less or more than ht hours. In this set up, the agents can
be made better o⁄ by introducing lotteries to convexify their choice sets. By entering
a lottery an agent can choose to work a fraction bt 2 (0;1) of his days while remaining
unemployed for the rest fraction (1 ￿ bt) 2 (0;1) of his time.
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where, the upper index e denotes "employed", u "unemployed", and s "supply".







So, by de￿ning ct+j = ce
t+j = cu














t+j + (1 + rt+j)ks
t+j
Note that ht is assumed by Hansen (1985) to be a constant ho and the probability
bt is the only control variable for the households￿labor decision.
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and, as usual, we assume that the productivity shock zt evolves according to the law
of motion :
zt+1 = ￿zzt + ￿z
t+1
with ￿z 2 (0;1); and ￿z
t+1~N(0;￿2
z).
In equilibrium, we have,
In the labor market, hd
t = hs
t = ht;
In the capital market, kd
t = ks
t = kt;
In the goods market, ct + [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)kt] = yt:
Also according to Proposition(1), we have bt = vt to close the model, as implicitly
applied in Hansen(1985).
3Proposition 1. The representative agent￿ s lottery probability bt of getting a job
converges in probability to the economy￿ s employment rate ￿t if the economy￿ s population
is large enough.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lottery theory of labor supply is quite successful, and the macroeconomy acts
just as if it were populated with a more elastic supply of labor, even if each individual
agent may have no elasticity of labor supply since ht can be assumed to be a constant.
The above RBC model is designated as model (1), the benchmark model for model
(3), which is to be de￿ned in section 3.
Now we start from model (1) to de￿ne model (2). Model (2) is simply model (1)
plus a condition on capital utilization, and it is the benchmark model for model (4),
which is to be de￿ned in section 4.









Generally, in the RBC literatures investigating capital utilizations, it is assumed
that the depreciation rate ￿t takes a convex functional form of the capacity utilization
rate ￿t. For example, in Baxter & Farr(2001), it is assumed that
￿t= ￿o+￿1 ￿ ￿
1+￿
t =(1 + ￿) (2)
where, the related parameters are assumed to be such that ￿1 > 0;￿ > 0.






Adding assumption (2) into model (1), and correspondingly replacing de￿nition (1)
with de￿nition (3), we get model (2) based on model (1). Needless to say, once again
we have to use Proposition(1) to close the model.
3. A BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL WITH STICKY PRICING AND ENDOGENOUS
CAPITAL : MODEL (3)
Now we start from model (1) to de￿ne model (3), the business cycle model with
sticky pricing and endogenous and ￿rm-speci￿c capital.
The economy is composed of monopolistically competitive ￿rms of measure 1 and
in￿nitely-lived households. Each ￿rm specializes in producing one di⁄erentiated goods
4i 2 [0;1] with the same degree of market power of pricing. Households have diversi￿ed
preference of all of these products.
For modeling simplicity, we also assume that only the pricing of goods is sticky while
the pricings of labor and capital, i.e., wage wt and interest rate rt are ￿ exible.
In our modeling process, we use a two step approach to capture the ￿rm￿ s problem.
The ￿rm￿ s problem is decomposed as two steps, one is on sale and the other on pro-
duction. So, ￿rstly we de￿ne and solve the ￿rm￿ s production problem, in which ￿rms
will minimize their production costs, hence generate their factor including capital and
labor demand functions. Secondly, we will de￿ne and solve the ￿rms￿sale problem, in
which the ￿rms will optimize their sale prices to maximize pro￿ts. The advantage of
such two step approach is, we can derive out and use the cost function consistent with
our production function assumption in the ￿rms￿optimal pricing processes.
The model (3) is de￿ned in sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 subsequently.
3.1. The Household￿ s Problem
Following Hansen(1985) that there is a lottery for the households to make labor
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where, probability bt+j, wages wt+j and capital returns rt+j are assumed to be
universal for any i 2 [0;1], and, ￿(i)t+j is ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t at period t+j.
Also, following Hansen (1985), we still assume that the working hours h(i)s
t+j for










so, we have lt+j = 1 ￿ ho:






￿t = ￿tp(i)tc(i)t (6)
alog(1 ￿ ho) + ￿tptwtho = 0 (7)
Et[￿tpt ￿ ￿￿t+1p(i)t+1(1 + rt+1)] = 0 (8)
plus its budget constraint (5), which now has to be binding so that the Lagrangian
multiplier ￿t+j 6= 0 .
Following Dixit & Stiglitz (1977), we here de￿ne the representative household￿ s ag-


















Note also that by ￿rst deriving out ￿t = [ptct]￿1 using equation (6) and de￿nitions





which is functionally the same as what it appeared to be in Dixit & Stigilitz (1977).
It may be worth noting that originally in Dixit & Stiglitz(1977), they concluded that
￿￿t < 0 is approximately the related demand elasticity by neglecting the e⁄ect of each
p(i)t on pt, hence the indirect e⁄ect on c(i)t. But, as is shown in Proposition(2), ￿￿t is
precisely the price elasticity of the related consumption goods i 2 [0;1].
Proposition 2. In the above de￿ned representative household￿ s problem, for any
consumption goods i 2 [0;1], its consumption demand elasticity is not approximately
but precisely ￿￿t < 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.2. The Firm￿ s Problem
As has been explained, here we will decompose the ￿rms￿problem in two steps.
First, we will solve the production cost minimization problem, then, in the second step,
we consider the ￿rm￿ s price optimization problem in a Calvo pricing environment.
Following the de￿nition (1) on production technology, we assume that the production
function for any ￿rm specializing in producing goods i 2 [0;1] is a Constant Return To
Scale (CRTS)2 Cobb-Douglas type, i.e.,
2The two-step approach is also able to incorporate straightforwardly the IRTS production technology
into the model. Suppose that the production function is not necessarily CRTS, so, we write generally









where, the productivity term zt+j is universal for any ￿rm i 2 [0;1],
logzt= (1 ￿ ￿z)logz+￿z logzt￿1+￿z
t (13)
with its stochastic shock ￿z
t ￿ i:i:d:N(0;￿2
z):














Note that the FOCs will be the same for both real and nominal cost minimization
problems since the factor markets including the capital and labor markets are assumed
to be universally priced for all ￿rms.
















Following the same algebra in the CRTS case, the real cost function m(i)t+j can be derived as











It is well known that in a competitive market, the ￿rms don￿ t have pro￿t maximizing production plans
unless ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1; i.e., production technology has to be decreasing return to scale or at most CRTS
with zero pro￿t. Now, we want to stress that when the ￿rms have market powers, this conclusion
doesn￿ t necessarily hold any more. On the contrary, when the ￿rms have market powers, the ￿rms may
have their maximum pro￿ts with appropriately de￿ned IRTS production technology. Let￿ s consider the
following simple case to see the possibility.
First assume that the pricing is ￿exible, so that the ￿rm￿ s pricing problem is just one period problem.
Also for convenience we assume that the ￿rms are monopoly suppliers. Then, the ￿rm￿ s one period




where, m(i)t+j is still de￿ned as the real marginal cost function. For simplicity, we assume that y(i)t =
a￿p(i)￿￿
t , where, as usual, for the monopoly ￿rm, we assume that ￿ > 1 so that its price markup will be





a > 0 , and b > 0 denotes a ￿ pt ￿
m(i)t
y(i)t and, ￿ 2 (0;1) for IRTS assumption. Then, the FOC will be
a(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ p￿(i)￿￿
t +b￿￿ ￿p￿(i)￿￿￿￿1
t = 0. Using the FOC, the second order condition can be expressed
as p￿(i)￿￿￿1
t fa(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ [(1￿￿)￿ ￿ 1]g. It￿ s easy to check that if ￿ 2 ( 1
1￿￿;1), then the second order
condition will be negative, i.e., the ￿rm now will have a maximum pro￿t under IRTS. Note that the
lower bound 1























Plugging these two equations into the objective function (14), we get the real cost
function m(i)t+j as







where, ￿c = [( ￿
1￿￿)1￿￿ + ( ￿
1￿￿)￿￿]:
Now is the second step to consider the ￿rm￿ s pricing problem.
For simplicity we adopt the Calvo assumptions on pricing environment, i.e., at each
period ￿rm specializing in goods i 2 [0;1] will with a constant probability & 2 (0;1)
simply update its product price from pt￿1 to p(i)t = ￿pt￿1, and with the rest probability
(1 ￿ &) 2 (0;1) adjust its product price p(i)t from pt￿1 to p￿
t. Here, following the
literature, for example, Kimball (1996), we assume that the steady state of the gross
in￿ ation rate ￿t ￿
pt
pt￿1 satis￿es ￿ ￿ 1.







j[￿jp(i)ty(i)t+j ￿ pt+jm(i)t+j]g (18)
where, m(i)t+j is the real cost function, as de￿ned by equation (17), ￿ is the non-
stochastic nominal discount factor.
We will ￿rst in the next sub-section consider the market equilibrium conditions,
then, go back solving problem (18) and give the results in Proposition (3).
3.3. Market Equilibriums
In equilibrium,












in the goods market, we may simply write the equilibrium condition as
y(i)t+j = c(i)t+j + I(i)t (21)
where, I(i)t represents goods i produced by ￿rm i to supply all ￿rms￿investment
demands in goods i to accumulate its capital aggregates, which may be viewed as an
analogue of the household￿ s consumption aggregate as de￿ned in (9).





t+1+j ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)k(i)s
t+j) (22)
Note that in the expressions k(i)s
t+j and k(i)s
t+1+j; the index i simply refers to
the capital accumulated in ￿rm i in period t+j, while from the goods perspective,
these expressions actually represent composite aggregates of all goods. Following the
de￿nition (9) for consumption goods aggregate, we can analogously let It+j represent
the aggregate of investment goods and as a result of goods market equilibrium it should
satisfy
It+j =k(i)s









Following Proposition(2), we assume analogously that the elasticity of investment




With this assumption, we can get the following result on the ￿rm￿ s price optimization
problem de￿ned by (18).
Proposition 3. For the ￿rm i 2 [0;1]; with its problem de￿ned by (18), if the
steady state ￿ of the gross in￿ation rate ￿t ￿
pt
pt￿1 is su¢ ciently close to 1 such that
&￿￿ 2 (0;1), then, its optimizing price p￿(i)t will satisfy
x(i)t ￿ &￿￿Etx(i)t+1 = y(i)t (25)
where,











Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that in the aggregate level, according to the Calvo pricing assumption and the



































function of gross in￿ ation rate ￿t. By the de￿nition of x(i)t, we know that x(i)t is a
function of in￿ ation rate ￿t: So, the equation (25) in Proposition (3) is an expression
for the so-called New Philips Curve (NPC) for the above business cycle model.
As showed above, the ￿rm￿ s problem can be decomposed into two sub-problems, with
the ￿rst sub-problem on cost minimization, and the second sub-problem on optimizing
prices. This two step approach can be justi￿ed using backward induction. That is,
the ￿rm will ￿rst think of how to maximize the present value of its intertemporal
nominal pro￿ts through optimizing its sale prices, while in this sale-in-advance price
optimizing process, it has to evaluate its cost function, i.e., the most economic factor
input combinations to implement the optimal price calculated out in the previous pricing
decision.
Now, with the above given problems of households and ￿rms, and the market equi-
librium conditions, we have de￿ned the competitive equilibrium of a business cycle
model with price stickiness and endogenous capital.
4. INCORPORATING CAPITAL UTILIZATIONS INTO MODEL (3) : MODEL (4)
Now consider an extension of introducing capital utilization into the business cycle
model de￿ned in Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. And as has been explained, this model is
designated as model (4) in coming simulations.
Let￿ s ￿rst consider the ￿rm￿ s problem.
For the ￿rm specializing in producing goods i 2 [0;1], its production problem, i.e.,












t+j]1￿￿ ￿ y(i) (28)
￿(i)t+j= ￿o+￿1 ￿ ￿(i)
1+￿
t+j =(1 + ￿) (29)
where, equation (28) and (29) are rewritten according to equations (12) and (2).
Note that here, in the labor market, it is the households that accept the ￿ uctuations
of employment rate, i.e., in equilibrium, the ￿rms only have to pay those who get
employed, while in the capital market, it is the ￿rms that have to accept the ￿ uctuations
of capital utilizations.
Observing the FOCs of the Lagrangian equation of the problem, note ￿rst that for
the optimal ￿(i)t+j, we have
rt+j + ￿t+j= ￿1 ￿ ￿(i)
1+￿
t+j (30)
then, both ￿(i)t+j and ￿(i)t+j can be expressed as functions of rt+j according to
equation (30) and de￿nition (29). So, the problem now is analogous to the case without
capital utilization considerations. Referring to problem (14) and FOCs (15) and (16),

























Also referring to equation (17), the real cost function m(i)t+j can be expressed as








Then, referring to Proposition (3), the ￿rms￿optimal price p￿(i)t will satisfy the
same functional form given the above re-de￿ned m(i)t and y(i)t, i.e.,
x(i)t ￿ &￿Etx(i)t+1 = y(i)t
where, again









(￿t ￿ 1) + 1]
and, again we can replace
p
￿(i)t
pt with the gross in￿ ation rate ￿t ￿
pt
pt￿1 according to
the aggregate price equation (27).
The household￿ s problem remain the same since capital utilization is only directly
associated with ￿rms. So, the related FOCs are the functionally same as equations (6),






￿t = ￿tp(i)tc(i)t (34)
￿a + ￿tptwt = 0 (35)
Et[￿tpt ￿ ￿￿t+1p(i)t+1(1 + rt+1)] = 0 (36)
With the above re-de￿ned problems of households and ￿rms and the market equilib-
rium conditions, we have extended model (3), which is de￿ned in sections 3.1, 3.2 and
3.3, to model (4), which is simply model (3) plus capital utilization.
5. SIMULATION RESULTS OF THE FOUR BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS
First we report the calibration results of the related parameters for all models. The
calibration results are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
￿ r & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿z ￿z
0.36 0.015 0.86 1.0086 12 0.86 0.025 1.00 0.95 0.712* 0.468**
Note: * For model (1) and (3); ** For model (2) and (4), the less variance is
compensated by the magnifying e⁄ect of capital utilization.
11For parameters commonly used in four models, readers may refer to Hansen (1985),
Cooley & Prescott (1995), Baxter & Farr(2001) and King & Rebelo (1999). For the
parameter calibration results associated with the NPC, in particular, we set & = 0:86,
i.e., 86% of the ￿rms will not adjust their product prices, referring to the GMM estima-
tion results by Eichenbaum & Fisher (2003). Also, according to the simulation results,
the parameter ￿ ought to be quite larger than 1, so, the mark up will be quite close
to 0, i.e., the monopoly degree of the macroeconomy is quite low. The calibrated ￿ is
obtained as the value which makes the simulated variance of in￿ ation be closest to that
of the actual economy.
In Table 3, 4, 5, and 6, we report the simulated results of the variances, persistences
and covariances of the key variables of the models. The simulation is made for 80 periods
from year 1980 to 2000 for the in￿ ation considerations. In addition, we give in Appendix
1 all of the models￿impulse responses due to productivity shock in four graphs for models
(1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively.
Table 3 : Simulation Results of Model (1)
std corr(x(t + j);y(t))
Output 1.75 0.27 0.47 0.71 1.00 0.71 0.47 0.27
Capital 0.53 0.69 0.66 0.56 0.38 0.09 -0.13 -0.29
Cap utilization Na Na
Labor 1.30 0.13 0.35 0.63 0.98 0.74 0.53 0.35
Consumption 0.56 0.55 0.67 0.78 0.87 0.53 0.25 0.03
Investment 6.20 0.17 0.39 0.66 0.99 0.73 0.52 0.33
Capital return 0.07 0.07 0.30 0.59 0.96 0.74 0.55 0.38
In￿ ation Na Na
-3 -2 -1 j = 0 1 2 3
Table 4 : Simulation Results of Model (2)
std corr(x(t + j);y(t))
Output 1.75 0.27 0.47 0.71 1.00 0.71 0.47 0.27
Capital 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.55 0.37 0.08 -0.13 -0.29
Cap utilization 0.91 0.03 0.26 0.56 0.93 0.74 0.56 0.40
Labor 1.29 0.18 0.40 0.66 0.99 0.73 0.51 0.32
Consumption 0.50 0.47 0.62 0.78 0.94 0.60 0.33 0.11
Investment 6.17 0.21 0.42 0.68 1.00 0.73 0.50 0.31
Capital return 0.04 0.03 0.26 0.56 0.93 0.74 0.56 0.40
In￿ ation Na Na
-3 -2 -1 j = 0 1 2 3
Table 5 : Simulation Results of Model (3)
12std corr(x(t + j);y(t))
Output 1.75 0.27 0.47 0.71 1.00 0.71 0.47 0.27
Capital 0.53 0.69 0.66 0.56 0.38 0.09 -0.13 -0.29
Cap utilization Na Na
Labor 1.30 0.13 0.35 0.63 0.98 0.74 0.53 0.35
Consumption 0.56 0.55 0.67 0.78 0.87 0.53 0.25 0.03
Investment 6.20 0.17 0.39 0.66 0.99 0.73 0.52 0.33
Capital return 0.07 0.07 0.30 0.59 0.96 0.74 0.55 0.38
In￿ ation 0.53 -0.27 -0.47 -0.71 -1.00 -0.71 -0.47 -0.27
-3 -2 -1 j = 0 1 2 3
Table 6 : Simulation Results of Model (4)
std corr(x(t + j);y(t))
Output 1.75 0.27 0.47 0.71 1.00 0.71 0.47 0.27
Capital 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.55 0.37 0.08 -0.13 -0.29
Cap utilization 0.91 0.03 0.26 0.56 0.93 0.74 0.56 0.40
Labor 1.29 0.18 0.40 0.66 0.99 0.73 0.51 0.32
Consumption 0.50 0.47 0.62 0.78 0.94 0.60 0.33 0.11
Investment 6.17 0.21 0.42 0.68 1.00 0.73 0.50 0.31
Capital return 0.04 0.03 0.26 0.56 0.93 0.74 0.56 0.40
In￿ ation 0.53 -0.27 -0.47 -0.71 -1.00 -0.71 -0.47 -0.27
-3 -2 -1 j = 0 1 2 3
For the corresponding statistics of the actual economy, these have been calculated
by many papers, for example, Cooley & Hansen (1995). Comparing with the literature,
the simulation results of our model (3) and (4) are quite normal, in particular, the
variances of all of the endogenous variables are quite close to those of the actual economy.
Essentially, this is primarily because in symmetric equilibrium, money (in￿ ation) in
this model turns out to be superneutral, i.e., in our model (3) and (4), which have
monetary frictions, the equilibrium determination of all real variables is independent
of the in￿ ation rate. So, the models are able to achieve quite good ￿tness. Also, it is
again demonstrated in model (4) that the capital utilization can magnify the response
e⁄ects of the technological shock, so, we need less volatile exogenous technical shock to
generate business ￿ uctuations.
However, there remains a very big challenge, i.e., the simulated correlations between
in￿ ation and output is not good enough compared with those of the actual economy.
In actual economy, in￿ ation ￿t+j; where j ￿ 0; generally has a signi￿cant positive
correlation with output yt. For example, according to the estimations by Cooley &
Hansen (1995), the correlations corr(￿t+j;yt) for j = 0;1;2;3;4;5 are all distributed in
the interval [0.34, 0.47]. But according to Table 5 and 6, the simulated correlations
didn￿ t show such positive correlations.
136. CONCLUDING REMARK
This paper is a quite preliminary study attempt on the quite challenging issue of
nominal aspect dynamics of business cycle theory. And basically, it should be viewed
as an exercise to try to understand the related literature in existence.
Theoretically, we manage to incorporate both sticky pricing and capital (further
capital utilization) into business cycle models. Empirically, as revealed by the simulation
results, the cyclical behaviors of our business cycle models with sticky pricing and
endogenous capital are quite normal compared with the standard RBC literature. In
particular, in all of the models, the variances of all of the endogenous variables are
satisfactorily close to those of the actual economy. This is mainly because in symmetric
equilibriums of our models (3) and (4), money turns out to be superneutral.
The problem of the paper is, the simulated correlations between in￿ ation and output
are not good. So, we need further working on this aspect.
7. APPENDIX 1
The impulse responses to productivity shock of Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) are given
in the following graphs respectively.
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Model(1)￿ s impulse responses to productivity shock.
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8. APPENDIX 2
Proof of Proposition(1):
Proof. In the aggregate level, in period t, let Nt denote the number of individuals
who want to get a job. Then, we know that there will be Ne
t individuals who will get
jobs, and Nu
t individuals who will get no jobs at period t, where, surely Ne
t +Nu
t = Nt.
Given the representative agent assumption, i.e., given all of the individuals assumed to
be identical, then according to the Chinkine￿ s LLN, we get that the employment rate
￿t ￿ Ne
t =Nt ￿ 100% converges to pt in probability since the economy￿ s total population
is assumed to be large enough.
Proof of Proposition(2):
Proof.
￿ First taking log of equation (11) and taking derivative of logp(i)t considering the









































































￿t 6= 1 , or [
p(i)t




So, the price elasticity of goods c(i)t is precisely ￿￿t.
Note that in the above derivation process we considered the indirect e⁄ects due
to both pt and ct.
￿ For any two consumption goods i1 6= i2 2 [0;1], as shown by Dixit & Stiglitz(1977),







so, ￿t > 0 is precisely the elasticity of substitution between these two consumption
goods i1 6= i2 2 [0;1].
19Proof of Proposition (3):
Proof.






its FOC of p(i)t can be written as


















jy(i)t+jg = 0 (￿)
￿ For ￿rm i 2 [0;1], we have y(i)t = c(i) + I(i)t
According to our discussion and assumption made on the goods market equilib-





















p(i)t ) = ￿(
(￿t￿1)c(i)t+y(i)t
p(i)t ).
















￿ Plugging these conditions into equation (*), we have



















jy(i)t+jg = Etx(i)t (￿￿)









Since & 2 (0;1), ￿ 2 (0;1), so, &￿ 2 (0;1), then, by assuming that the steady
state of the gross in￿ ation rate ￿ ￿ 1 is su¢ ciently close to 1 so that &￿￿ 2 (0;1),






jy(i)t+jg = Et(1 ￿ &￿￿F)x(i)t = x(i)t ￿ &￿￿Etx(i)t+1









= x(i)t ￿ &￿￿Etx(i)t+1
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